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Abstract 
Policy-makers have long been concerned with the quality of local political leadership 
and have often resorted to institutional reform to try to improve political leadership. This 
paper looks at a specific and neglected facet of the political management reforms that 
have been implemented in English local government over the last decade: the tenure and 
turnover of cabinet members. The tenure of top politicians may be an important influence 
on the performance of local government particularly when political management is 
designed to favour individualised leadership. On the one hand, excessively short tenures 
for top politicians may damage the ability of governments to develop strategic plans and 
ensure they are implemented while on the other hand the risk of loss of office is central to 
political accountability and excessively long tenures may be indicative of an insulated 
and unresponsive elite. While some research attention has been paid to the tenures of 
leaders of councils in England there is little systematic information about the tenure of 
cabinet members. This paper discusses the relevance of cabinet stability and provides an 
overview of recent experience in England. 
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1. Introduction1
In 2000 the UK parliament passed an Act that was designed to strengthen the political 
leadership of English local governments. It aimed to make local leadership more 
efficient, transparent and accountable by establishing small executive cabinets which 
would be responsible for the day to day decision-making of local authorities. The 
concerns about local political leadership were not limited to England. In the early 2000s 
a number of European countries were reforming local political leadership or considering 
it (Borraz and John, 2004) and similar issues have been discussed in this journal in 
relation to South African municipalities (de Vissier, 2010). This paper uses the English 
reforms to explore an important aspect of political systems: the stability of political 
leadership.  
  
 
The research that has been conducted on the effects of the English reforms has focused 
largely on the role of the leaders of councils (for example Greasley and Stoker, 2008; 
Lowndes and Leach, 2004). This is entirely appropriate but it has downplayed the 
importance of the other members of a council’s cabinet (for an exception see Bochel and 
Bochel, 2010). Consequently, we currently know very little about the tenure and turnover 
of cabinet members and certainly less than is known about the leaders of councils (Boyne 
et al. 2010). This is an important issue, cabinet members are expected to become expert 
and lead strategy development in their portfolios and at the same time they are 
accountable for the council’s performance in the areas that they cover. The first of these 
expectations would seem to require some stability of tenure to allow cabinet members to 
gain experience of their portfolios, develop political leadership skills and see projects 
through to completion. However, accountability requires that poor political performance 
should sometime lead to the removal of a cabinet member. The pattern of tenures of 
cabinet members will therefore partly reflect the trade off between political 
accountability and political capacity, however there are a number of other factors that 
may influence the survival of local cabinet members and can thus muddy the issue.  
 
This paper explores cabinet instability in the context of local political cabinets in 
England. It starts with a discussion of the history of political management reform in 
England covering its goals, its implementation and the debates over some of its 
consequences. The next section then discusses the literature that has developed recently 
on cabinet and portfolio holder stability at the national level. The final section of the 
                                                 
1  The collection of the data used in this paper was funded by the ESRC, RES-061-25-0244. 
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paper presents data on the relationship between political stability, cabinet change and the 
length of tenure of local portfolio-holders drawn from an ESRC research project.  
  
2. Reforming Local Political Management 
Good governance is the goal of reformers in many political systems and institutional 
redesign is often a favoured way of achieving reform. Institutional redesign is appealing 
because in theory it promises a lasting effect and, once completed, no further 
interventions are required. There are reasons to doubt this theory; institutions are much 
more complex than is implied by the reformers' story. Few deny that changing formal 
structures has an effect on organisations but organisations also exist through the beliefs 
and actions of their members, the tacit rules of institutions cannot be precisely 
engineered by legislation and they have the potential to subvert the intentions of 
reformers (March and Olsen 1984; Lowndes, 2005). In short, institutions are path 
dependent, their histories limit their future trajectories and these in turn limit the 
predictability of the effects of reforms (Pierson, 2000). Once it is also recognised that 
contextual factors can strongly influence the way that abstract models operate after they 
are implemented in real organisations, there are then reasons to doubt that the plans of 
reformers will be fully achieved (Lowndes and Leach, 2004).  
 
When it comes to English local democracy, institutional reform has often been the 
weapon of choice for national policymakers. Over the last half century there have been 
institutional re-organisations of various flavours and there is little sign that the pace will 
let up. The current coalition government's Localism Bill 2011 proposes that council 
leaders in the twelve largest English cities outside London will become 'shadow mayors' 
and referendums will be held on whether they should become directly-elected mayors.2
 
 
This represents a continuation of earlier and substantially unsuccessful efforts to 
introduce mayoral governance to English cities. At the same time the 2011 Bill loosens 
the requirement that all the larger councils must operate with a political executive cabinet 
distinct from the council as a whole.  
This paper focuses on the operation of political cabinets introduced by the Local 
Government Act 2000. These new structures were an important element of New Labour's 
modernisation agenda with respect to local government (Bochel and Bochel, 2010). The 
objectives of the 2000 Act were to create visible and effective leadership; to enhance 
                                                 
2  At the time of writing the Bill is being considered by the House of Lords 
<http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-11/localism.html> (accessed 18 July 2011). 
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democratic legitimacy; and to provide checks and balances in the construction of the new 
system (Gains et al. 2009 summarise the findings of an extensive evaluation project). 
These objectives reflected a concern that the operation of local politics in England was 
flawed (Pratchett, 2004) often failing to address issues of community concern or failing 
to ensure the quality of services. The focus on strengthening leadership through 
institutional reforms produced some criticisms, for example that its effects had been 
limited and diverse (Lowndes and Leach, 2004). Away from the English context a 
general note of caution about 'being bitten by the leadership bug' has recently been 
sounded by (Grant et al. 2011, 66) who argued that the focus on leadership may be a 
distraction from the more fundamental problems faced by local government and that 
there may be unintended consequences resulting from changes to models of leadership.  
 
The most radical of the reform options was for a council to have a directly-elected 
mayor. Traditionally, leaders have been selected by councillors from the council body 
but the directly-elected mayors were to be placed in office by the electorate as a whole, 
loosening the role of political parties in leader selection. Once elected, the mayor then 
selects a cabinet drawn from the council. Very few (initially ten) areas opted for a 
directly-elected mayor, with the vast majority of councils selecting a less radical reform 
called the leader-cabinet system (Gains et al. 2005). With this option there were three 
features that marked a formal and significant change from the previous committee 
system. The first feature was the selection of a small group of executive members from 
the main body of the councillors to form a cabinet. These executive cabinets were given 
responsibility for implementing policy across the range of council functions3
                                                 
3  With the exception of regulatory functions such as planning and licensing. 
 within a 
framework adopted by the council as a whole. They were also expected to play a key role 
in developing policy proposals, budget making and prioritisation. Under the previous 
system there was no legal differentiation between ‘executive’ and ‘non-executive’ 
councillors but even before the introduction of executive structures researchers were able 
to identify an increasing distinction between lead and backbench councillors (Elcock 
cited in Bochel and Bochel, 2004, 39). The new system formalised and to an extent 
strengthened that distinction. The second feature was that partisan membership of the 
new cabinets was not required to be proportional to the party seat share on the council as 
a whole. After the reform, where a single party holds a majority on a council the majority 
group can, and usually does, establish a single party executive cabinet. The third feature 
was the potential to give individual cabinet members delegated power to make executive 
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decisions in their areas of responsibility. This strengthening of leadership was 
accompanied by a range of features designed to ensure executive accountability, for 
example scrutiny committees, 'call-in' powers and key decision rules (Leach and Copus, 
2004). 
 
The initial response to the legislation by councils was marked by a small ‘c’ 
conservatism. The leader-cabinet councils were cautious about giving leaders all the 
powers allowed in the legislation (Gains et al. 2005) but as the system settled down more 
councils strengthened the position of their leader (Gains et al. 2009). Formal structure 
was only one influence on the way that cabinets operated and different councils found 
different ways to make their cabinets work. Some cabinets were dominated by the leader, 
others allowed individual portfolio holders greater discretion, others were more 
committed to collectivist decision-making (ELG, 2004; Lowndes and Leach, 2004). The 
story of the implementation of the Act was of continuing diversity of operation within 
the legal framework.  
 
Variety of political context is among the most important of the sources of this diversity. 
The legislation’s model of strong and effective leadership may be vulnerable to the 
operation of the local electoral system and local party systems. On local elections, 
although there is evidence of a performance-vote link (Boyne et al., 2009) it is 
undoubtedly true that in England local elections are second order elections – they are 
often strongly influenced by national factors and if the political control of a council 
changes it may have little to do with the actions of the local parties or the performance of 
local incumbents. On the influence of parties, inter and intra party rivalries may, for 
better or worse, push local political management away from the legislation’s goals. 
Perfectly competent and effective cabinet members may have to leave office for reasons 
that have little to do with their decisions or management.  
 
The legislation allowed for some variety in implementation but it seems clear that the 
Government’s preference was for a ‘strong leadership’ model. This model did not 
necessarily imply leaders monopolising decision-making, but rather their having the tools 
to select and manage their cabinets (Bochel and Bochel, 2010; Greasley and Stoker, 
2008; Greasley and John, 2011). As yet we lack even basic knowledge about how long 
local cabinet members serve and what sorts of factors influence turnover of executive 
politicians. The next section will review recent debates about why tenure of national 
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cabinet members may be important and argues that similar issues are worth pursuing at 
local level.  
 
3. Dynamics of Cabinet Governance 
Where political institutions are designed to produce collectivist decision-making and 
accountability the rate of turnover of individual politicians may not be too important. 
Collective structures may be more robust to changes in personnel because responsibility, 
relevant experience and knowledge is dispersed across a number of individuals. In 
cabinet systems, however, individual politicians play an important role in the policy 
process, they are allocated portfolios and are expected to lead the construction of strategy 
for policy and service development. If there is too much 'churn' in the occupants of 
cabinet positions then the policy process may be damaged (Huber and Martinez-
Gallardo, 2008).  
 
In research on parliamentary democracy a great deal of attention has been given to the 
termination of governments but less so to the length of ministerial careers. Recent 
analysis has however explored the relationship between government termination, cabinet 
turnover and ministerial tenure (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). The analysis of 
national cabinets has generally approached the question from the assumption that the 
leader decides who serves, which portfolio each holds and when they will be moved or 
removed. These powers can help leaders to manage political difficulties and to deliver 
policy goals (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). However, there are problems that are 
common to all processes of selection: how can a leader know she is getting the right 
person for a given portfolio? The problem of ministerial talent is that it may not be 
observable in advance of appointment. The leader will try to develop ways of screening 
ministerial candidates and the more successful the leader is at this the less likely it is that 
they will inadvertently appoint a weak minister. A second problem relates to whether a 
leader can monitor and manage the cabinet. Much of what is involved in the ministerial 
job is not easy to monitor, many ministerial actions will involve giving informal 
direction to officials and sending signals to, or making deals, with members of policy 
communities. Ministers will accumulate specialised knowledge and information giving 
them an advantage in negotiations with the leader and this will be a problem if ministers 
have goals that differ from those of the leader, i.e. representing departmental interests at 
the expense of the common interest of the government (Indridason and Kam, 2008).  
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Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2008) demonstrate that in national parliaments the link 
between government termination and the termination of individual ministers’ jobs is 
quite weak. Not all ministers leave office when a government ends and many ministers 
leave office whilst the government remains (2008: 171). Berlinski et al. (2010) in their 
analysis of the impact of performance on ministerial tenure, find support for the claim 
that a minister’s performance relative to the performance of other ministers is important 
for explaining when they leave office. This research starts from the assumption that the 
leader is (formally) empowered to select and remove their cabinet members. Huber and 
Martinez-Gallardo (2008) discuss the constraints that may be imposed on leaders’ 
discretion by the existence of coalition government or other factors but the general 
picture is of cabinet members serving at the invitation of the leader.  
 
From National to Local 
The key question is whether the factors that are relevant for explaining patterns of 
change and stability in national cabinets are relevant to local governments. Just because a 
local authority has a cabinet structure it does not follow that it will display the same 
dynamics as national cabinets. The low profile of local government in England is not 
helpful in identifying the reasons why a cabinet member has left office. It is often not 
easy to uncover whether a ‘resignation’ is really a resignation. However, there have been 
some high profile examples of local cabinet members resigning as a result of failures in 
the service they oversee. The case that made the national media related to the failings in 
child protection in Haringey and the resignation of the relevant portfolio holder (along 
with the leader and the sacking of a member of staff).4 Another example from Milton 
Keynes relates to a failure in a school building project.5 However, there are other reasons 
for cabinet members to leave office, for example to pursue outside interests, or because 
of personality clashes, or, in one case, a reported involvement with gun-running in the 
distant past.6
 
  
Here, I discuss four ways in which national and local politics potentially diverge: the 
motivations of politicians may be different at the different levels; local council leaders 
have a smaller pool of politicians from which to select their cabinets especially if they 
have a small majority; the level of task complexity for local portfolio-holders is lower 
                                                 
4  <http://www.communitycare.co.uk/Articles/2008/12/01/110138/baby-p-haringey-leader-and-childrens-
cabinet-member-resign.htm> 
5  <http://www.miltonkeynes.co.uk/news/local/council_boss_urged_to_resign_1_866019>  
6  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/3543467/Tory-councillor-quits-cabinet-after-
former-membership-of-IRA-disclosed.html>. 
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than in national government; and, at local level in England the electoral cycle is fixed 
which breaks the link between an administration collapsing and new elections. One of 
the key assumptions of most analysis of national cabinet politics is that, for whatever 
reason, politicians seek and wish to retain executive office (in their conclusion Berlinski 
et al. 2007 discuss whether this is always the case). Whether or not it is a safe 
assumption at national level when we move to local politics we are studying a group of 
individuals who may have careers to attend to outside local government. There are 
certainly councillors who do not seek cabinet position either because they have a full-
time job, a family or because they wish to enjoy their retirement. Nevertheless, even 
taking into account these factors, the appeal of holding or not holding cabinet position is 
likely to still be related to, for example, how much political conflict there is or how well 
the services for which a cabinet member is responsible are performing. That is to say, 
length of cabinet tenure will have some relation to politics and performance and so can 
still play a role in accountability. 
  
Another significant difference between national and local governments is that the smaller 
size of local councils gives leaders less freedom to shuffle or remove cabinet members 
(although this may also be a problem nationally, Dewan and Myatt, 2010). Local leaders 
have to find their cabinet from a small pool of politicians, the size of which depends on 
the size of the parties in the administration and the willingness of members to take up 
cabinet positions. This scarcity may limit the scope for leaders to use selection and 
removal as tools to manage cabinets.  
 
The third difference is that at national level the size and complexity of government is 
such that it may be difficult for a leader to ‘keep tabs’ on the decisions and performance 
of their cabinet. At the local level this problem is significantly mitigated. Local 
government is less complex than national politics and over the last decade the 
administrative centres of local government have been strengthened by a plethora of 
performance monitoring structures and the increasingly important role of the chief 
executive and corporate directors in the administrative structure. These changes allow 
leaders access to the type of information which may be useful in managing political 
performance. Having said all that, the monitoring problem that leaders face is not trivial. 
Local government in England is large compared to many systems, it is responsible for the 
delivery of a range of complex services and portfolio holders typically do have ‘their 
own’ officials who provide them with information and support.  
 
GREASLEY: Cabinet Governance and Political Stability 
 
 
CJLG May-November 2011 60 
  
Finally, a fourth structural difference between local and national is the relationship 
between the collapse of political administrations and the timing of elections. Elections in 
local authorities operate on a fixed timetable, there is no scope for local leaders to call an 
election, so if the cabinet loses the confidence of the council then a new administration 
has to be formed from the existing body of politicians. The electoral system of English 
local government adds a further complication because in a large proportion of councils 
the elections occur ‘by thirds’. In these authorities, the council as a whole never stands 
for election7
 
 instead a third of council seats are up for election in a given year, with one 
year out of four left ‘fallow’ when no election occurs. The implications of this are that 
the balance of the council can change more frequently where elections occur by thirds 
compared with where all out elections are held, and different politicians within a cabinet 
will be due for re-election at different times.  
In summary, a fundamental concern with the application of the research on ministerial 
careers to local cabinets is that the nature of local politics is simply different, perhaps 
less competitive, or less calculating or less ideological than national politics. The 
approach of this paper is to assume that local cabinets are political institutions like other 
political institutions and are subject to fundamentally similar pressures. There is some 
evidence that indirectly supports this position. Bochel and Bochel’s (2010: 733-4) paper 
discusses the way that council leaders in a variety of authorities think about the process 
of selecting cabinet members and allocating portfolios. Leaders are well aware of the 
importance of these powers but as Bochel and Bochel point out in the context of multi-
party coalition the leader's discretion is constrained with respect to cabinet selection and 
portfolio allocation. Greasley and John (2011) presents some evidence that where leaders 
have powers related to the management of cabinets (selection and portfolio allocation) 
the relative performance of their council as judged by citizens is improved. This finding 
is consistent with, although hardly proof of, the proposition that selection, management 
and removal of executive members plays an important role in achieving political 
accountability. However, there is remarkably little direct evidence on the careers of local 
cabinet members. The next section provides an initial exploration of cabinet stability. It 
starts with an overview of urban councils in England, exploring the relationship between 
elections, leader change and cabinet stability over a five year period. The paper then 
focuses on the experience of the London Boroughs over a single election cycle.  
 
                                                 
7  With the exception of immediately after a periodic electoral review and a redrawing of boundaries.  
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4. Cabinet Stability: An Initial Exploration  
This section explores how frequently politicians leave local political cabinets. The aim is 
to present an overview of the level of stability in local executive political leadership and 
to start to understand how much of it is driven by factors such as electoral change. If 
cabinet membership only really changes with elections or change in political control then 
that would be strong evidence that leaders are not using their powers to remove poor 
performing portfolio holders. In that case, researchers would need only to understand the 
aggregate measures of political instability: electoral change and change in administration. 
This section shows that while these aggregate factors exercise an important influence on 
executive member turnover they are by no means the whole story.  
 
The advantages of studying local governments are that there are multiple cases to analyse 
and that many factors are held constant. The downside is that the required information 
may not be available and where it is available it is often dispersed and requires 
significant work bringing it together. The data for this paper was taken from the official 
papers of local councils accessed via their websites. For each council year (normally 
running from May to April) the names of cabinet members and the leader at the start of 
the year were recorded. In many cases these names were reported in the minutes of the 
Annual Meeting of the council, failing that a second source of cabinet membership is the 
agenda of cabinet meetings which often lists the names of cabinet members. If the names 
of cabinet members could not be found using either of those methods the membership of 
a cabinet was constructed using the minutes of cabinet meetings. Where this final source 
was used, names from the minutes of the first meeting of the council year (typically in 
May) were checked against the minutes of at least the two subsequent cabinet meetings.  
 
The data relates to the English urban local authorities namely the metropolitan boroughs, 
the London boroughs and the unitary authorities.8
                                                 
8  It does not include the ‘re-organised’ unitary authorities that came into being in 2009.  
 It includes information on 114 
councils and cabinet memberships from 2004/05 to 2009/10. The primary unit of analysis 
in the data is the ‘council-year’. In this paper I am interested in stability and change, 
consequently the first year of observations for any council drops out - nothing can be said 
about the change in cabinet in 2004/05 because the information on cabinet membership 
in 2003/04 is not included in the data. The focus is on members leaving the cabinet (from 
this point forward referred to as ‘leavers’), hence the measure of change for ‘council A in 
year 2’ is the number of politicians’ names in a cabinet at the start of ‘year 1’ that do not 
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feature in the cabinet at the start of ‘year 2’. So, for example, if the 2006/07 cabinet of 
Barking and Dagenham is missing 2 names that were in the 2005/06 cabinet, then for the 
council-year ‘Barking and Dagenham 2006/07’ the value of ‘leavers’ would be 2. For 
some councils, there are gaps in data in the earlier years of the time period, in total there 
are 511 ‘council-year’ observations in the dataset for which the change data discussed in 
this section is available.  
 
On average 1.88 members left a local cabinet in a council-year, the median number of 
leavers in a council-year was 1 and in just under 31 per cent of the council-years there 
were no leavers. The maximum number of changes that can occur is 10 (the maximum 
size of a cabinet) but some cabinets have fewer than 10 members, to account for this 
variation in cabinet size the percentage of a previous year’s cabinet members that had left 
by the subsequent year was calculated.9
 
 On average just under 21 per cent of members 
were leavers in any given council-year (see Table 1 for a summary). This average is 
inflated by the cases where a council as a whole changes political hands but not as much 
as might be expected. This is because, firstly there are not that many examples of change 
of political control in the data (45 cases) and secondly, changes in political control 
frequently involve a move from ‘no overall control’ to a single party majority (or vice 
versa), in such cases it is not unusual for some of the sitting cabinet members to survive 
in office. Considering only those instances where there had been no change in the 
political control (466 cases) an average of 17 per cent of previous year’s cabinet 
members were leavers, but where there had been a political change an average of 58 per 
cent were leavers. 
The direct effect of electoral factors can be removed from the analysis by looking only at 
those cabinet-years where no election was held. There were 302 observations where there 
was no election, and on average in these cases 13 per cent of cabinet members left office 
(compared to 31 per cent where there was an election). There were also still a few 
examples where the whole of a cabinet left office even when there had not been an 
election, these cases are likely to represent the collapse of multi-party coalitions or 
minority administrations and their replacement by rivals from other parties.  
  
In one of the high profile examples of local cabinet resignation discussed earlier, both a 
cabinet member and the leader resigned. In this data the leader changed in 93 of the 
                                                 
9  Percentages are also problematic here, because the denominator is so small they are very sensitive to small 
changes. 
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council-years (approximately 18 per cent), and this was quite strongly correlated with the 
percentage of cabinet leavers in a council year (Kendall’s tau b= .36; p=.000). In cases of 
change in political control we would expect the cabinet and its leader to go down 
together although the relationship is more complicated in transitions from or to no overall 
control. Looking only at those cases where there had been no change in political control, 
although the correlation is not as strong, there is still evidence of a moderate relationship 
between change in leader and percentage of cabinet leavers (Kendall’s tau b =. 25; 
p.=.000)10
 
.  
Table 1. Average percentage of cabinet leavers per council-year, by political context  
 
 Average % 
leavers  
Overall 21% 
Change political control 
No change 
58% 
17% 
Election year 
No election year 
31% 
13% 
Leader change 
No leader change 
48% 
12% 
 
This initial look at cabinet member tenure demonstrates that political change, election 
years and leader change are quite strongly associated with an increase in the average 
proportion of leavers. Having said that, there does also seem to be a certain amount of 
change that is not associated with those factors. As Figure 1 shows, the number of 
leavers per council-year does tend to be lower when there is no election and the 
distribution for non-election years is more skew, with a large minority of cabinets losing 
no members (left panel). However, there remains a fairly substantial level of change in 
evidence.  
 
It is difficult however to understand from this analysis the substantive importance of this 
instability for councils. For example, the changes that do occur may have been 
concentrated in a few councils which had considerably greater instability than others or 
they may have been spread evenly across councils with many experiencing a relatively 
low level of change. The next subsection looks at this question by focusing only on the 
London Boroughs over a single electoral cycle. 
                                                 
10  There is little change if the no overall control councils are also taken out. 
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Figure 1. Number of cabinet-leavers, election year compared to no election year  
 
Cabinet stability in London  
There are thirty-two London Boroughs that govern the capital along with the Mayor of 
London and the Greater London Authority. On average they serve populations of just 
over 235,000 people, ranging from the smallest (Kingston-upon-Thames) at 160,000 to 
the largest (Croydon) at nearly 337,000. London Boroughs share the same election 
timetable and they have all-out elections every four years so there is an extended period 
of operation without an election looming. This makes them a useful setting to look at 
variation in cabinet stability across time. The data in this subsection starts with the 
elections of May 2006, and then measures changes in cabinet membership until the start 
of the final year in the electoral cycle in May 2009. This means that there is information 
on three rounds of possible changes (2006/07 – 2007/08; 2007/08 - 2008/09; 2008/09 – 
2009/10). As before, if a politician who was in the cabinet at the start of the 2006/07 year 
was absent from the cabinet at the start of 2007/08 then this is coded as the end of their 
tenure. 
 
Figure 2 shows how many leavers there were per council over the whole electoral cycle. 
Only four London Boroughs went through to the start of the final year without a cabinet 
member leaving: Hillingdon, Lewisham, Newham and Sutton. Figure 2 does suggest that 
the distribution of leavers across councils was not even and that cabinet instability in 
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London over this period was concentrated in a small number of authorities. The highest 
score was eleven in Tower Hamlets, with Redbridge and Southwark also experiencing a 
relatively large number of leavers. One implication of this is that, for these councils at 
least, it seems unlikely that the end of cabinet careers can be satisfactorily explained by 
personal or idiosyncratic factors, it looks as if there were certain councils that 
experienced greater instability for whatever reason. Looking at the most unstable – 
Tower Hamlets, Redbridge, Southwark – Southwark had no single party in overall 
control, Tower Hamlets had a Labour majority and Redbridge had a Conservative 
majority. Political conflict may be important in these councils, but if it was it was 
occurring within as well as between parties. A second feature to note is that the three 
mayoral authorities in London are all clustered towards the left of the figure, they had 
relatively stable cabinets and this may reflect the strength of position of the mayors in 
selecting their executive members.11
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Figure 2: Number of ‘cabinet-member terminations’ (including leaders) 2006/07 – 
2009/10, London Boroughs12
 
  
                                                 
11  This does not generalise to all mayoral authorities in England, some of which have experienced 
considerable instability. 
12  A key to council labels can be found in the appendix at the end of the paper. 
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The first part of this section showed that there were non-trivial levels of cabinet 
instability in English city councils even when looking only at council-years which did 
not experience elections or political change. Although the instability of cabinet 
membership is related to political change, elections and leader change it is also in part 
independent of these factors. The second part of this section showed that in London 
Boroughs between elections the level of instability was not evenly spread, a small group 
of councils experienced greater churn suggesting that there may be council level 
variables explaining stability and instability in local cabinets. As yet there is little that 
can be said about what may be causing instability and what the consequences of it are. 
This is an important priority for future research.  
  
5. Conclusions 
Stability of leadership can be crucial for the effective operation of democracy but 
whether it is good or bad will depend on contextual factors. If government is performing 
well then excessive churn in leadership positions may damage policy making. It may 
make strategic decision making difficult and it will give leaders the incentive to pay 
attention to the short term rather than the long term. On the other hand, where cabinet 
members hold long tenures this may indicate unresponsiveness and a lack of 
accountability in the political system. If the performance or policy making in a policy 
area is poor then changing the politician with direct responsibility for the area is one of 
the possible responses. The difficulty for democracies is that it is often really difficult to 
distinguish between these two conditions because sometimes organisational performance 
may have to dip before it can improve. For example, responsible politicians with an eye 
on the long term performance of a government may have to take unpopular decisions in 
the short term, but is it possible to distinguish them from politicians who are unpopular 
because they are bad at their jobs? The tenure of cabinet members reflects how this 
balance is being struck. The role of local portfolio holders was arguably very important 
to the success or failure of the institutional reforms under the Local Government Act 
2000 but it has received limited research attention. The analysis here explores an aspect 
of the variation in the context in which these portfolio holders have had to operate. Some 
cabinets are populated by members who can be confident that they will be in post for 
some time in other cabinets the future of its members is less secure.  
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Appendix: Key to labels, Figure 2 
 
Barking and Dagenham BD Kensington and Chelsea KC 
Barnet Bar Kingston upon Thames KT 
Bexley Bx Lambeth Lam 
Brent Brnt Lewisham Lew 
Bromley Brm Merton Mer 
Camden Cam Newham New 
Croydon Cry Redbridge Red 
Ealing Eal Richmond-upon-Thames RT 
Enfield Enf Southwark Sthw 
Greenwich Grn Sutton Sttn 
Hackney Hk Tower Hamlets TH 
Hammersmith and Fulham HF Waltham Forest WF 
Haringey Hary Wandsworth Wands 
Harrow Harr Westminster Wstmr 
Havering Hav   
Hillingdon Hill   
Hounslow Houn   
Islington Isl   
 
